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COMMENT
RETHINKING MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN
THE DIGITAL WORLD: PROPOSING A STREAMLINED
TEST AFTER THE DEMISE OF THE INVERSE RATIO
RULE
“[T]he dissent prophesies that our decision will shake the foundations of copyright law, imperil the music industry, and stifle
creativity.”1
INTRODUCTION
I simply cannot copy your song if I have never heard it before. In
a hypothetical world in which I truly had no exposure to your musical composition, any eerie similarities between our two songs
must necessarily be the product of our own individual imaginations. Indeed, copyright law protects such independent creation.2
Determining that one song was copied from another, therefore, requires two things: that the songs be “too” similar, whatever that
means, and that the second author have had some kind of access
to the first author’s work.3
In reality, however, songs can only be so similar before a rational
person will start to suspect that one songwriter must have had access to the other songwriter’s work—even if that access cannot be
proven. When the similarity between two songs is high enough, we
begin to infer access even in the absence of evidence.4 On the other

1. Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1182 (9th Cir. 2018). Despite the majority’s dismissal, time showed the dissent to be eerily prescient.
2. E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46, 348 (1991).
3. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018); Rentmeester v. Nike,
Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018).
4. Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1124.
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hand, however, if the songs are only mildly similar, we typically
demand more proof of access before we are willing to chastise the
second author for copying.5
This inference gives rise to the now largely defunct inverse ratio
rule6—a three-word phrase that struck fear into the hearts of musicians within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While seemingly logical, the inverse
ratio rule created three untenable situations; each resulted in
deeming a song “copied,” which, most artists would likely agree, is
a badge of shame.7 In the first, one songwriter could be found liable
for copying—even in a song which bore little similarity to the supposed original—when a high amount of access to that supposed
original could be shown.8 In the second, a song could be slapped
with the “copied” stamp when it shared significant similarity with
another, despite the songwriter having little access to the supposed
original, because of the satisfaction of the inverse ratio rule9—a
conclusion that seems to fly in the face of copyright’s supposed protection of independent creation. This scenario is often referred to
as “subconscious copying.”10 Finally, the rule deemed “copied”
songs that innocently drew on the inspiration of, or paid overt homage to, the work of another musician11—an incredibly common phenomenon that artists have described as paying tribute to the “legacy” of influential musicians.12

5. Id.
6. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 2020).
7. See, e.g., Christine Nishiyama, Inspiration vs. Imitation: How to Copy as an Artist,
MIGHT COULD STUDIOS (Sept. 2019), https://might-could.com/essays/inspiration-vs-imitat
ion-how-to-copy-as-an-artist/ [https://perma.cc/2GVC-AZNG].
8. Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1068 (citing Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187–88 (2d
Cir. 1961)).
9. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 484–85 (9th Cir. 2000) (first citing
Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1220 (9th Cir. 1996); and then citing Baxter v. MCA, Inc.,
812 F.2d 421, 423, 424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987)).
10. Id. at 482–84. Subconscious copying, of course, can also occur in a high-access scenario. This Comment does not examine genuine examples of subconscious copying (or, for
that matter, cases of deliberate copying) but rather focuses on troublesome implications of
the inverse ratio rule—in this case, the notion that a song with high substantial similarity
to another, even with a low level of access, must have been subconsciously copied.
11. Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018), is widely seen within the music
industry as an example of this issue. See infra notes 53, 81–82 and accompanying text.
12. Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers in
Support of Appellants, Williams, 885 F.3d 1150 (No. 15-56880), 2016 WL 4592129, at *16
[hereinafter Songwriter Amici Brief].
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In the face of such a bewildering rule, I might stop publishing
songs altogether. After all, if I face a copyright lawsuit every time
I compose—given that I have heard a wide array of songs in my
lifetime—I may very well decide the risk is not worth the reward.
I may derive my deepest joy from songwriting, but since I do not
have $5 million to pay your damages award, prudence dictates I
remain silent.
This is the landscape song composers faced after a surprise 2015
verdict,13 in which a California jury found that Robin Thicke and
Pharrell Williams had infringed the copyright of Marvin Gaye’s
Got to Give It Up with their smash hit, Blurred Lines14—the bestselling single in the world in 2013.15 Despite the fact that the two
songs share little musical similarity—at least in the opinion of the
music industry16—the courts hit Thicke and Williams with a $5.3
million payout, along with fifty percent of royalties generated by
their song.17
On appeal, when two members of a three-judge Ninth Circuit
panel did not find enough reason to overturn the jury’s verdict,18
panic set in.19 The music community shared the opinion20 of Judge
Jacqueline Nguyen, who in a spirited dissent argued that the majority had allowed for copyrighting of a musical style.21 “[B]y refusing to compare the two works,” Judge Nguyen wrote, “the majority
establishes a dangerous precedent that strikes a devastating blow
to future musicians and composers everywhere.”22
This Comment will discuss the devastating blow to musicians
inflicted by the Blurred Lines verdict’s embrace of the inverse ratio
13. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL
4479500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015).
14. Id.
15. Williams, 885 F.3d at 1160.
16. See, e.g., Rhodri Marsden, If You Think Robin Thicke’s Blurred Lines Plagiarises
Marvin Gaye, You Don’t Understand Songwriting, NEWSTATESMAN (Mar. 12, 2015), https://
www.newstatesman.com/culture/2015/03/if-you-think-robin-thickes-blurred-lines-plagiaris
es-marvin-gaye-you-dont-understand [https://perma.cc/FX7T-TMU7].
17. Williams, 885 F.3d at 1162–63.
18. Id. at 1182–83.
19. See infra section II.B.
20. See, e.g., Brian McBrearty, Stairway to Heaven, Blurred Lines, and the Silly Inverse
Ratio Rule, MUSICOLOGIZE (Feb. 6, 2019), http://www.musicologize.com/stairway-to-heavenblurred-lines-and-the-inverse-ratio-rule/ [https://perma.cc/D5E6-EKW5].
21. Williams, 885 F.3d at 1183 (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
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rule.23 Then, I will examine the Stairway to Heaven decision, in
which the Ninth Circuit sharply changed course and decided to abrogate the inverse ratio rule.24 This welcome policy change nevertheless leaves questions as to how the Ninth Circuit will balance
considerations of access with substantial similarity as it assesses
copying in future cases. More importantly, the explosion of access
in the digital world has fatally weakened—across all circuits—the
role of access within the infringement test. In that light, I will conclude with a modified standard by which music copyright infringement cases should be judged.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Before delving into the Blurred Lines and Stairway to Heaven
cases, I will lay a foundation by outlining the law as it existed at
the time the decisions were reached. Two notes are in order.25 First,
while different circuits may express the music copyright infringement test in varying terms, the test itself is largely the same across
the nation. I will use the test as the Ninth Circuit frames it. Second, sometimes “substantial similarity” under the test’s copying
prong is referred to as “striking similarity” or “probative similarity,” presumably to avoid confusion with the “substantial similarity” required under the unlawful appropriation prong.26 The Ninth
Circuit, however, uses the term “substantial similarity” for both
prongs,27 as do courts across the nation.28 The following diagram

23. Id. at 1163 (majority opinion).
24. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 2020).
25. An additional issue also bears mentioning: The intrinsic test under the music copyright infringement test’s unlawful appropriation prong is highly problematic in that it gives
consideration to unprotectable elements. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116,
1125 (9th Cir. 2018); Christopher Jon Sprigman & Samantha Fink Hedrick, The Filtration
Problem in Copyright’s “Substantial Similarity” Infringement Test, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 571 (2019). Such concerns, however, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
26. See, e.g., Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1064.
27. “Unfortunately, we have used the same term—‘substantial similarity’—to describe
both the degree of similarity relevant to proof of copying and the degree of similarity necessary to establish unlawful appropriation. The term means different things in those two contexts.” Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018). “Although these requirements are too often referred to in shorthand lingo as the need to prove ‘substantial
similarity,’ they are distinct concepts.” Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1064.
28. “The more serious difficulty of describing the tests to determine infringement is
compounded because two of the crucial terms in the infringement analysis, ‘copying’ and
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outlines the relevant portions of music copyright infringement law
at the time of the Blurred Lines decision.29

As demonstrated by the diagram above, there are two prongs to
copyright infringement analysis: (1) copying, sometimes called
“copying-in-fact,” and (2) unlawful appropriation, sometimes called
“misappropriation.”30 The first “copying” prong is intended to serve
as a sort of gatekeeper for the second and more stringent “unlawful
appropriation” prong. Because copyright law theoretically protects
independent creation—even of identical works31—the thinking is
that some level of copying must be proven in order to find infringement.32 Suits that clear this gatekeeping bar then proceed to a
more rigorous unlawful appropriation analysis, given that not all

‘substantial similarity,’ are used with different meanings in different contexts. The ambiguous use of these terms is so strongly embedded in the judicial decisions that the best thing
to do is simply be aware of the ambiguities and be careful about the sense in which these
words are being used at any given time.” 2 HOWARD B. ABRAMS & TYLER T. OCHOA, THE LAW
OF COPYRIGHT §§ 14:3, 14:5 (2020).
29. The doctrine in this diagram is drawn primarily from Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1064;
Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1125; Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1116–17, 1124; and Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162–65 (9th Cir.
1977). Although the Ninth Circuit abrogated the inverse ratio rule on which Krofft and
Rentmeester relied, the non-inverse ratio rule parts of the cases remain good law.
30. See supra note 29.
31. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46, 348 (1991).
32. See infra section IV.B.2.c for discussion of how this gatekeeping function, while
laudable in theory, fails its intended purpose. I therefore propose streamlining the infringement test to do away with this confusing prong altogether.
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copying constitutes infringement.33 As shown above, the inverse
ratio rule applies to the first step of analyzing the existence of copying, but not to the second test for unlawful appropriation.34
A. What Is the Inverse Ratio Rule?
The Ninth Circuit adopted the inverse ratio rule in 1977—thirtyeight years before the Blurred Lines decision and the same year in
which Gaye wrote Got to Give It Up—in a case about children’s television characters.35 The plaintiffs had created a children’s puppet
television show and were in talks to allow McDonald’s restaurant
to use those popular characters to market hamburgers.36 The advertising agent working with the plaintiffs, however, stated the
deal was canceled while secretly proceeding with the deal on his
own.37 In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit invoked the inverse ratio
rule:
[W]here clear and convincing evidence of access is presented, the
quantum of proof required to show substantial similarity may . . . be
lower than when access is shown merely by a preponderance of the
evidence. As Professor Nimmer has observed: . . . “[S]ince a very high
degree of similarity is required in order to dispense with proof of access, it must logically follow that where proof of access is offered, the
required degree of similarity may be somewhat less than would be
necessary in the absence of such proof.” . . . We believe that th[e] degree of access [in this case] justifies a lower standard of proof to show
substantial similarity [under the first prong of the infringement
test].38

Because copyright law protects even identical works if they were
independently created,39 access to an original work is necessary to
prove copying of that work in the first prong of infringement analysis.40 In fact, if a plaintiff can show that an alleged infringer had

33. De minimis copying is not illegal, Feist, 499 U.S. at 363, nor, usually, is copying of
unprotectable elements, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See infra note 55.
34. Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1124.
35. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172
(9th Cir. 1977).
36. Id. at 1161.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1172 (internal citations and alterations omitted).
39. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46, 348 (1991).
40. We will see, however, that “proving access” as a concept has become meaningless in
our digital world. See infra sections IV.A, IV.B.1.
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access to her work, the inverse ratio rule steps in to lower the
amount of similarity she must show between her work and the
work of the alleged infringer.41 The inverse ratio rule looks like
this:42

B. Three Problems with the Inverse Ratio Rule
The problem with the inverse ratio rule, however, is that its implications do not make sense. While Nimmer’s statement holds logically true, it describes a static reality: If a high degree of similarity
“dispense[s] with” the requirement to prove access, a lower degree
of similarity must necessarily require proof of access.43 It does not,

41. Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018).
42. Due to the uncertainty in how the inverse ratio rule actually functions—such as to
what exact degree it lowers the bar for substantial similarity—it is impossible to draw a
mathematically precise graph. Even the question of whether the inverse ratio rule line
crosses the Y axis (i.e., whether high access will totally do away with the need to demonstrate similarity) is unclear. See infra notes 47, 143 and accompanying text.
43. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1172.
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however, support the sliding scale inference pictured in the above
graph’s depiction of the inverse ratio rule, nor does it support the
type of analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit in the Blurred Lines
case: “We adhere to the ‘inverse ratio rule,’ which operates like a
sliding scale: The greater the showing of access, the lesser the
showing of substantial similarity is required.”44 Or, as the Ninth
Circuit put it in a case decided only one month earlier, “the
stronger the evidence of access, the less compelling the similarities
between the two works need be in order to give rise to an inference
of copying.”45
Taken to its logical conclusion, the inverse ratio rule provides
that a plaintiff who can prove a high amount of access to a song
need only prove minimal similarity in order to prove copying.46
This is what the mathematical reality embodied in the graph above
demonstrates. Yet many people might think that the inference is
nonsensical. Just because I am highly familiar with your song does
not mean that my song takes from it, parallels it, or even remotely
sounds like it in any meaningful way. To hold my song to that
standard is to erode my creative rights as a musician.
But a plaintiff likely must still prove some similarity between
the works.47 Given the aesthetically limited number of musical
combinations with which songwriters work, however, a minimal
amount of similarity will almost certainly be found among any two
songs in a copyright suit, particularly after filtering for western
music, then again for contemporary western music, then again for
genre, and then again for current popular trends within genre. Indeed, a common complaint is that current music all sounds the
same.48 As Judge Learned Hand said, “It must be remembered
that, while there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the musical notes of the scale, only a few are pleasing; and

44. Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1163 (9th Cir. 2018).
45. Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1124.
46. Id.
47. Whether high, proven access to an “original” work can completely obviate the requirement of similarity is unclear. See supra note 42; infra note 143 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Michael A. Lanier, Why Does Every Song Sound the Same?, ODYSSEY (Oct.
25, 2016), https://www.theodysseyonline.com/why-does-every-song-sound-the-same [https://
perma.cc/4FGB-EBLV]; Tom Barnes, Scientists Just Discovered Why All Pop Music Sounds
Exactly the Same, MIC (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.mic.com/articles/107896/scientists-fina
lly-prove-why-pop-music-all-sounds-the-same [https://perma.cc/36ZE-ANTD].
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much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popular ear. Recurrence is not therefore an inevitable badge of plagiarism.”49
This is precisely why the other logical extreme of the inverse ratio rule—an automatic finding of “copying” in a situation with high
similarity between works but little access to the supposed original—is so problematic. To be sure, subconscious copying can and
does occur. A famous example of genuine subconscious copying exists in George Harrison’s My Sweet Lord, which a judge found to
have infringed upon the Chiffons’ He’s So Fine.50 The issue, however, is the fact that the inverse ratio rule facilitates an automatic
finding of copying in a low-access situation when two songs sound
highly similar. While the creator of a supposed original should certainly have the right to sue a songwriter over a highly similar song,
copying—subconscious or otherwise—ought to be truly proven rather than assumed by way of the inverse ratio rule. Indeed, as a
humorous video mashup of dozens of musically identical “fourchord songs” illustrates, much of popular music sounds highly similar while remaining on the proper side of copyright law.51 Such
situations often fall squarely within copyright law’s scènes à faire
doctrine (French for “scenes that must be done”), which does not
afford protection to expression so common that it is “bound to recur.”52
The third untenable situation created by the inverse ratio rule
occurs when a songwriter draws on the inspiration of, or pays overt
homage to, the work of an influential musician. The rule does not
stomach such tribute, despite the fact that the artistic world
thrives on inspiration: “From time immemorial, every songwriter,
composer, and musician has been inspired by music that came before him or her. . . . This is especially so within a particular musical

49. Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940).
50. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff’d sub nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir.
1983).
51. Axis of Awesome, All Popular Songs Are the Same 4 Chords, YOUTUBE (Sept. 16,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFpryVMgni0 [https://perma.cc/6TCQ-4ECW].
52. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B][4]
(2020); see, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under
the . . . doctrine of scenes a faire, courts will not protect a copyrighted work from infringement if the expression embodied in the work necessarily flows from a commonplace idea;
like merger, the rationale is that there should be no monopoly on the underlying unprotectable idea.”).
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genre. Virtually no music can be said to be 100% new and original.”53 Rather, the rule coldly calculates access and substantial
similarity without regard to ephemeral inspiration, then spits out
a label: copied.
To be fair, courts do not use the inverse ratio rule to completely
settle whether copyright infringement occurred. As previously
noted, the inverse ratio rule applies only to the first step of copyright analysis: whether copying took place.54 Once more than a de
minimis55 amount of copying has been established, the court turns
to the second step of copyright analysis: whether unlawful appropriation occurred.56 The Ninth Circuit judges this step with a twopart analysis: the extrinsic test, which involves an “objective comparison of [only the] protected areas of a work” and often requires
expert testimony; and the intrinsic test, which compares the two
works as a whole and asks whether an “ordinary, reasonable person would find the total concept and feel of the works to be substantially similar.”57 So although the inverse ratio rule is not the
end-all-be-all of copyright infringement analysis, enough problems
with the rule exist to make its conclusions highly troubling.
One final note is in order: By lowering the amount of substantial
similarity that must be shown when a work is highly accessible,
the inverse ratio rule unfairly privileges highly popular works. As
the Ninth Circuit explained:
[T]he inverse ratio rule unfairly advantages those whose work is most
accessible by lowering the standard of proof for similarity. Thus the
rule benefits those with highly popular works . . . which are also
highly accessible. But nothing in copyright law suggests that a work

53. Songwriter Amici Brief, supra note 12, at *9. Tracing the rich legacy of drawing on
artistic inspiration is beyond the scope of this Comment.
54. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1130 (9th Cir. 2018); Rentmeester v. Nike,
Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018).
55. “De minimis” is short for the legal principle de minimis non curat lex, or “the law
does not concern itself with trifles.” De minimis non curat lex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019). “[C]opyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess
more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
56. Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1130.
57. Id. at 1125 (quoting Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir.
2000)); Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1124.
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deserves stronger legal protection simply because it is more popular
or owned by better-funded rights holders.58

Against this legal backdrop, the Ninth Circuit upheld a deeply
troubling jury verdict in the Blurred Lines case that found copyright infringement of what many legal and artistic minds labeled
an unprotectable musical “style” or “feel.”59 Although the exact way
in which the inverse ratio rule facilitated this outcome remains uncertain, it nevertheless played a significant role by lowering the
bar the Gayes needed to clear in their quest to prove Thicke and
Williams had stolen their father’s song.60
II. BLURRED LINES DEALS A DEVASTATING BLOW
Dueling music experts testified at trial. Musicologist Judith Finell spoke on behalf of the Gayes, whereas musicologist Sandy Wilbur supported Thicke and Williams.61 Complicating their analysis
was the fact that the Blurred Lines suit fell under the Copyright
Act of 1909, which did not protect sound recordings.62 The copyright protection afforded to the Gayes, therefore, was limited to the
so-called “deposit copy” of sheet music submitted to the U.S. Copyright Office when the song was registered.63 Any elements contained in the sound recording of Got to Give It Up, but not in the
sheet music deposit copy, did not qualify for protection.64
After winnowing out the unprotectable musical elements in
Gaye’s song, the trial court compared the reports of the two musicologists, eventually determining that enough genuine issues of
material fact existed under the “unlawful appropriation” prong’s
extrinsic test to preclude awarding summary judgment to Thicke

58. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020).
59. See, e.g., supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text; infra note 82 and accompanying
text.
60. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
61. Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2018).
62. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL
4479500, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015); see Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§
1(e), 9–12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–78. Congress began protecting sound recordings under federal law in 1972. See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (providing for
“the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings”).
63. Bridgeport Music, 2015 WL 4479500, at *5.
64. Id.
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and Williams.65 At trial, the musicologists disputed each other’s
assertions about the similarities of the two songs.66 After a sevenday trial and two days of deliberations, the jury found that Thicke
and Williams had infringed Got to Give It Up.67 What elements of
the infringement analysis the jury considered, however, remain
murky.68 It appears that the inverse ratio rule’s thumb on the scale
lowered the definition of “substantial similarity” so significantly69
that the jury’s decision constituted, in the words of Judge Nguyen
in dissent, “finding substantial similarity between two pointillist
paintings because both have a few flecks of similarly colored
paint.”70
A. How Did the Ninth Circuit Apply the Inverse Ratio Rule?
In reexamining the Blurred Lines verdict, a two-judge majority
on the Ninth Circuit panel confined most of its review to determining typical appellate matters, such as whether the trial court had
abused its discretion or given wrong jury instructions.71 In fact, the
majority took explicit issue with dissenting Judge Nguyen’s detailed musical analysis of the facts of the case—or as the majority
somewhat sarcastically termed it, Judge Nguyen’s “expert review”—in commentary much bolder than is typically seen between
fellow judges.72 Against that backdrop, the court again invoked the
inverse ratio rule, but did so in a confusing manner:
65. Williams, 885 F.3d at 1161.
66. Bridgeport Music, 2015 WL 4479500, at *5–11.
67. Williams, 885 F.3d at 1159.
68. One of the main reasons I propose streamlining the music copyright infringement
test, even given the demise of the inverse ratio rule, is because the test as it currently stands
causes debilitating confusion. See infra section IV.B.2.a. The Blurred Lines decisions do not
shed much light onto whether the jury found substantial similarity under the first “copying”
prong of the infringement test. It appears—but is far from clear—that the jury did not assess
“copying” substantial similarity at all, and thereby improperly applied the inverse ratio rule
to lower the amount of substantial similarity needed under the second “unlawful appropriation” prong.
69. Williams, 885 F.3d at 1163.
70. Id. at 1183–84 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). In this quote, Nguyen refers to musicologist
Finell’s finding of substantial similarity, which, in agreeing with Finell, the jury apparently
adopted. See id.
71. Williams, 885 F.3d at 1167, 1170 (majority opinion).
72. Id. at 1182. “The dissent’s position violates every controlling procedural rule involved in this case. The dissent improperly tries, after a full jury trial has concluded, to act
as judge, jury, and executioner, but there is no there there, and the attempts fails. . . . Given
[its] flawed premise, it is perhaps unsurprising how little the dissent mirrors the majority
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Access and substantial similarity are inextricably linked. We adhere
to the “inverse ratio rule,” which operates like a sliding scale: The
greater the showing of access, the lesser the showing of substantial
similarity is required. Williams and Thicke readily admitted at trial
that they had a high degree of access to “Got To Give It Up.” The
Gayes’ burden of proof of substantial similarity is lowered accordingly.
We use a two-part test for substantial similarity: an extrinsic test and
an intrinsic test. For a jury to find substantial similarity, there must
be evidence on both the extrinsic and intrinsic tests.73

At first, the Ninth Circuit used “substantial similarity” to refer
to the first “copying” prong of the infringement analysis. But then,
the court appears to inexplicably shift to the second “unlawful appropriation” prong of the infringement analysis by describing the
extrinsic and intrinsic tests.74 Perhaps this is an example of the
confusion resulting from the dual use of the term “substantial similarity,” to which the Ninth Circuit later referred.75 At any rate,
this language makes an analysis of how the inverse ratio rule applied to the Blurred Lines decision almost impossible to formulate.
The court thus left analysts hunting for clues somewhat disappointed: It did not explicitly define precisely how the presence of
the inverse ratio rule relaxed the “substantial similarity” standard,
nor did it indicate what similarities satisfied the lower sliding scale
that would have failed to demonstrate substantial similarity in the
absence of the inverse ratio rule. Furthermore, it did not specify
under which prong of the infringement analysis it operated. Nevertheless, the rule played a clear role in the outcome of the case:
“Although the dissent criticizes the inverse ratio rule,” the majority
wrote, “the rule is binding precedent under our circuit law, and we
are bound to apply it.”76

opinion, and how far it veers into analysis untethered from the procedural posture of this
case.” Id. at 1178; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
73. Williams, 885 F.3d at 1163 (citations, quotation marks, and parentheticals summarizing other cases omitted, but court’s explanatory text retained in full) (first citing Swirsky
v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2004); and then citing Three Boys Music Corp. v.
Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000)).
74. Id. at 1163–64.
75. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text; infra note 178 and accompanying
text; see also infra section IV.B.2.a (discussing a case in which another judge from the Ninth
Circuit appears to make the same mistake).
76. Williams, 885 F.3d at 1163 n.6.
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B. Music Industry Responds to the Blurred Lines Decision
When the Blurred Lines decision came out, the music industry
was stunned by both the substance of the decision and the indecipherable way in which it was reached. “You’ve made it illegal to
reference previous material,” Gregory Butler, a Los Angeles composer and producer, told the Los Angeles Times.77 “I’m never going
to come up with something so radically different that it doesn’t contain references to something else.”78
“There’s no question in my mind that there has been a chilling
effect,” litigator Christine Lepera told the New York Times about
four years after the Blurred Lines verdict.79 In fact, music industry
insiders referred to the case as “the latest watershed, putting the
commonly understood rules of songwriting up for debate.”80
Perhaps because musicians do not typically study copyright law,
their critiques rarely pinpointed particular “substantial similarity”
errors they felt the Ninth Circuit had committed. Nevertheless, legal as well as artistic protests emerged in the wake of the Blurred
Lines verdict:
The law should provide clearer rules so that songwriters can know
when the line is crossed, or at least where the line is. . . . Appellants
have been found liable for the infringement of an idea, or a series of
ideas, and not for the tangible expression of those ideas, which is antithetical to Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act. Such a result, if allowed to stand, is very dangerous to the music community, is certain
to stifle future creativity, and ultimately does a disservice to past
songwriters as well. . . . The inherent danger of such a result is that,
without drawing a proper line between what is an idea and what is an
expression, or between what is an influence and what is an infringement, future songwriters do not know whether their “influence” is going to land them with the next hit record or land them in court—or
both, as demonstrated in this case.81

77. Victoria Kim, Randy Lewis & Ryan Faughnder, ‘Blurred Lines’ Ruling Stuns the
Music Industry, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/
la-me-ln-blurred-lines-ruling-roiled-the-music-industry-20150310-story.html [https://perm
a.cc/7PKC-32JJ].
78. Id.
79. Ben Sisario, ‘Blurred Lines’ on Their Minds, Songwriters Create Nervously, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/business/media/plagiarismmusic-songwriters.html [https://perma.cc/AYQ7-HSPZ].
80. Id.
81. Songwriter Amici Brief, supra note 12, at *2–3, *8. See also, e.g., Brief of Amicus
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As indicated above, musicians took legal issue with the third untenable situation created by the inverse ratio rule—the inability of
creators to enjoy artistic inspiration from music giants who had
come before them:
Quite simply, if an artist is not allowed to display his or her musical
influences, for fear of legal reprisal, there is very little new music that
is going to be created, particularly with the limitations that already
naturally exist in songwriting. . . . There appears to be no easy way,
no bright line, to determine in music cases—and it was certainly not
done in this case [Blurred Lines]—the difference between creating the
same “feel” or “style,” and infringing a copyright. . . . One might ask if
there is a better legacy for a songwriter than to inspire other songwriters to write music and pay homage to him for inspiring that music
. . . , keeping his name and his music alive for generations to come. . . .
It is difficult to imagine a songwriter that comes along after this case
publicly affording any credit to any influence that he or she receives
from any songwriter.82

After the Blurred Lines verdict, two related types of litigation
began to emerge. Fairly obscure artists, heartened by the sudden
success of dubious copyright claims, filed suit against megahits in
the hopes of taking some of the massive profits.83 And so-called
heritage producers, who hit their musical peak years ago, began
suing to take a slice of the money made by popular new songs.84
Christine Lepera’s insight shone true not long after she spoke to
the New York Times, when she defended singer Katy Perry against
a lawsuit by Christian rapper Flame.85 Flame contended that
Perry had stolen a distinctive musical line from his song Joyful
Noise to use in her smash hit Dark Horse.86 In closing arguments,
Lepera told the jury: “They’re trying to own basic building blocks

Curiae Musicologists in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, Williams, 885
F.3d 1150 (No. 15-56880), 2016 WL 4592128 [hereinafter Musicologist Amici Brief].
82. Songwriter Amici Brief, supra note 12, at *10, *12–13, *16.
83. See Amy X. Wang, How Music Copyright Lawsuits Are Scaring Away New Hits,
ROLLING STONE (Jan. 9, 2020, 2:08 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/features/musiccopyright-lawsuits-chilling-effect-935310/ [https://perma.cc/YDC5-5M9J].
84. See id.
85. Andrew Dalton, Jury: Katy Perry’s ‘Dark Horse’ Copied Christian Rap Song,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 30, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/7eef738596e9458eacb9f90
15d7fd7fe [https://perma.cc/UL2N-VFKV].
86. Id.
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of music, the alphabet of music that should be available to everyone.”87 Perry lost the lawsuit.88
“The aftereffects of the Blurred Lines decision . . . have been felt
most acutely by rank-and-file songwriters, who work in obscurity
even as their creations propel others to stardom,” the New York
Times wrote.89 “The ramifications for them have been inescapable,
affecting royalty splits, legal and insurance costs, and even how
songs are composed.”90
In fact, insurance rocketed into the forefront of the post-Blurred
Lines world once the inverse ratio rule made music copyright lawsuits so much easier to win.91 One music manager—Lucas Keller,
who has worked with Carrie Underwood and Muse—now encourages all his songwriters to obtain errors-and-omissions insurance
to protect themselves from even accidental copying.92 The music
industry understandably balks at the necessity of buying this insurance, which can cost anywhere from $20,000 to $250,000 a year,
but the stakes are high: “We all feel like the system has failed us,”
Keller told Rolling Stone.93 “There are a lot of aggressive lawyers
filing lawsuits and going ham on people.”94
Songwriters in particular bear the brunt of the inverse ratio
rule’s dominance, as they are typically far less wealthy than the
famous singers who perform their creations.95 “We’re all nervous
and afraid to fall into a battle over something as minor as a few

87. Id.
88. Judge Christina Snyder overturned the jury’s verdict as against the clear weight of
the evidence in March 2020, in a decision that was influenced by the verdict in the Stairway
to Heaven case. See Gray v. Perry, No. 2:15-CV-05642-CAS-JCx, 2020 WL 1275136, at *5,
*8, *18 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2020). The plaintiff has appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit.
Bill Donahue, Katy Perry Copyright Accuser Takes Case to 9th Circ., LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2020,
3:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1264505 [https://perma.cc/3ZEJ-A652]. See infra section IV.B.2.a for further discussion of Judge Snyder’s decision.
89. Sisario, supra note 79.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 83.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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notes or words,” Ross Golan, a songwriter for a slew of stars including Maroon 5 and Ariana Grande,96 told Rolling Stone.97
So the music industry held its breath when a member98 of a little-known band called Spirit sued Led Zeppelin, alleging that the
rock group stole its iconic introduction to Stairway to Heaven from
Spirit’s 1968 song Taurus.99 “The copyright lawsuit boom, and its
unintended side effects, may be just getting started,” Rolling Stone
warned as the case wound its way through the courts.100 But in a
stunning move, the full Ninth Circuit threw out the ruling of its
own three-judge panel101—and, less than two years after clinging
to the inverse ratio rule as binding precedent the court had no
choice but to apply,102 overturned the rule as bad law.103
III. STAIRWAY TO HEAVEN KILLS THE INVERSE RATIO RULE
Randy Wolfe, known professionally as Randy California, wrote
Taurus in 1966 or 1967, inspired by the astrological sign of “a
woman he loved and eventually married.”104 Spirit released the album containing Taurus in January 1968, having registered the
song’s copyright a month earlier.105 As the governing law at the
time of the song’s registration was the Copyright Act of 1909, the
song’s copyright did not extend to the recorded, audible version—
rather, it was limited to the single page of sheet music registered

96. Ross Golan, NMPA, https://nmpa.org/about/ross-golan/ [https://perma.cc/X7TQRHBM].
97. Wang, supra note 83.
98. The band member, Randy Craig Wolfe, died before the lawsuit was filed. Michael
Skidmore, co-trustee of the Randy Craig Wolfe Trust, filed suit on the trust’s behalf. See
infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
99. Plaintiff’s Complaint: Copyright Infringement and Related Claims Regarding Stairway to Heaven at 2–3, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 2014 WL 9909350 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2014)
(No. 15-cv-03462).
100. Wang, supra note 83.
101. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1079 (9th Cir. 2020).
102. Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1163 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018).
103. Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1069.
104. Id. at 1056; id. at 1081 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2018).
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as the deposit copy.106 Only musical elements written on the deposit copy were eligible for copyright protection.107
Led Zeppelin released its untitled fourth album, which would
come to be known as Led Zeppelin IV, in late 1971.108 On the album
was the famous Stairway to Heaven, written by guitarist Jimmy
Page and vocalist Robert Plant, including its now-classic guitar introduction.109 The song became an enduring success and is widely
considered one of the greatest rock songs of all time.110
A. Trial and First Appeal
Decades passed. Randy Wolfe died in 1997.111 In 2006, journalist
Michael Skidmore became co-trustee of the Randy Craig Wolfe
Trust.112 In 2014—forty-three years after Stairway to Heaven hit
the airwaves—Skidmore filed suit on behalf of the trust, alleging
that the song’s introduction infringed the introduction to Taurus.113
The Ninth Circuit later described the allegedly similar eightmeasure excerpt of the songs as follows:
The claimed portion includes five descending notes of a chromatic musical scale. . . . The beginning of Stairway to Heaven also incorporates
a descending chromatic minor chord progression in A minor. However,
the composition of Stairway to Heaven has a different ascending line
that is played concurrently with the descending chromatic line, and a

106. Id. at 1121, 1123; see Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 1(e), 9–12, 35
Stat. 1075, 1075–78.
107. Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1123.
108. Id. at 1122.
109. Id.
110. E.g., Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2020); Scott Colothan,
Led Zeppelin’s ‘Stairway to Heaven’ Voted the Greatest Rock Song, GIGWISE (Apr. 19, 2010,
1:59 PM), https://www.gigwise.com/news/55896/Led-Zeppelins-Stairway-To-Heaven-VotedThe-Greatest-Rock-Song [https://perma.cc/Y8Y6-SFWY]; VH1: 100 Greatest Rock Songs,
ROCKONTHENET (2000), http://www.rockonthenet.com/archive/2000/vh1rocksongs.htm [htt
ps://perma.cc/XZ53-Z8U7].
111. Allen Kim, Led Zeppelin Wins Major Copyright Battle for ‘Stairway to Heaven,’ CNN
(Mar. 10, 2020, 9:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/10/entertainment/led-zeppellinstairway-heaven-lawsuit-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/G6YU-TR62].
112. Id.
113. Plaintiff’s Complaint: Copyright Infringement and Related Claims Regarding Stairway to Heaven, supra note 99, at 2–3.
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distinct sequence of pitches in the arpeggios, which are not present in
Taurus.114

Just as in Blurred Lines, a battle of the experts ensued.115 Dr.
Alexander Stewart, testifying for the plaintiff, agreed that chromatic scales and arpeggios appear often in many songs, but found
the descending chromatic scales in Stairway to Heaven and Taurus
to be substantially similar because each omitted the note E and
returned to the root note A.116 Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit
later summarized, Stewart
pointed to three two-note sequences—AB, BC, and CF#—that appear
in both compositions. In his view, the presence of successive eighthnote rhythms in both compositions also made them similar. Finally,
he testified that the two compositions have the same “pitch collection,”
explaining that certain notes appear in the same proportions in the
beginning sequence of both works.117

Led Zeppelin’s expert, Dr. Lawrence Ferrara, did not agree.118 Ferrara
testified that the two compositions are completely distinct. . . . [and]
that the similarities claimed by Skidmore either involve unprotectable
common musical elements or are random. For example, Dr. Ferrara
explained that the similarity in the three two-note sequences is not
musically significant because in each song the sequences were preceded and followed by different notes to form distinct melodies. He
described the purported similarity based on these note sequences as
akin to arguing that “crab” and “absent” are similar words because
they both have the letter pair “ab.” He also testified that the similarity
in the “pitch collection” is not musically meaningful because it is akin
to arguing that the presence of the same letters in “senator” and “treason” renders the words similar in meaning.119

Most people have to look up Taurus online—the song is fairly
obscure. But that doesn’t matter, of course, to copyright law. Because independent creation is a defense to copyright infringement120—indeed, Led Zeppelin employed independent creation as

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1058.
Id. at 1059.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1059–60.
E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46, 348 (1991).
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its affirmative defense—the question became: Did Led Zeppelin
hear Taurus before composing Stairway to Heaven?121
At trial, no one disputed that Spirit and Led Zeppelin “crossed
paths in the late 1960s and the early 1970s,” wrote the Ninth Circuit.122 “The bands performed at the same venue at least three
times between 1968 and 1970. Led Zeppelin also performed a cover
of a Spirit song, Fresh Garbage. But there is no direct evidence that
the two bands toured together, or that Led Zeppelin band members
heard Spirit perform Taurus.”123 In fact, Page claimed never to
have seen a Spirit performance,124 though he admitted to having
an album containing Taurus in his collection.125 He stated, however, that he had not heard the song before composing Stairway to
Heaven.126 In 2016, the jury apparently agreed with Dr. Ferrara
that the songs were not substantially similar under the extrinsic
test and cleared Led Zeppelin of copyright infringement.127
Not so fast. In September 2018, a three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit resurrected the case on appeal, finding that trial Judge
Gary Klausner gave incorrect jury instructions.128 His errors may
have included his failure to instruct the jury to use the inverse ratio rule, which would have lowered the bar regarding the amount
of substantial similarity the plaintiff would need to prove under
the “copying” prong of infringement analysis.129 On remand, the
Ninth Circuit judges told the trial court to instruct the jury on the
inverse ratio rule unless the court determined, as a matter of law,

121. Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1058, 1064–65.
122. Id. at 1057.
123. Id.
124. Kim, supra note 111.
125. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018).
126. Id.
127. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV 15-03462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 WL 6674985, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016). The original opinion does not specify what kind of substantial similarity the jury found lacking. See id. at *2, *4. The Ninth Circuit, however, summarizes the
jury verdict by stating it did not find substantial similarity under the extrinsic text, which
falls under the second prong of analysis: unlawful appropriation. See Skidmore, 905 F.3d at
1124.
128. Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1121.
129. Id. at 1130–31. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that omitting the inverse ratio
rule instruction was harmless error, as the jury did not reach the question of copying given
its finding that Led Zeppelin had not unlawfully appropriated the song’s introduction. Id.;
see infra section IV.B.2.c.
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that Led Zeppelin had insufficient access to Taurus to trigger the
rule’s use.130
But something curious had happened two months prior to the
three-judge panel’s decision. After definitively stating in the
Blurred Lines verdict that the inverse ratio rule was binding precedent the court was compelled to apply,131 the Ninth Circuit in July
2018 released an amended version of its Blurred Lines opinion.132
What changed? One thing only: Every mention of the inverse ratio
rule, in both the majority opinion and the dissent, had been carefully deleted.133
B. Ninth Circuit Reverses Course
Ten months after the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in the Stairway to Heaven appeal, and less than
a year after releasing its mysteriously amended Blurred Lines decision, the Ninth Circuit agreed to re-hear Stairway to Heaven en
banc, stating that the earlier panel’s decision would not be cited as
precedent.134 The full Ninth Circuit heard the case again on September 23, 2019, and delivered its opinion about six months later
on March 9, 2020.135
The court issued no warm-up to what is arguably the most startling line in its opinion, given the havoc wreaked on the music industry by the Ninth Circuit’s embrace of the inverse ratio rule: “Because the inverse ratio rule, which is not part of the copyright
statute, defies logic, and creates uncertainty for the courts and the
parties, we take this opportunity to abrogate the rule in the Ninth
Circuit and overrule our prior cases to the contrary.”136 Only after
this sentence did the court launch into an explanation.

130. Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1130–31.
131. Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1163 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018); see supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
132. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
133. Compare Williams, 885 F.3d 1150, with Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106.
134. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 2019).
135. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020).
136. Id. at 1066.
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After first establishing that, throughout the nation, only the
Sixth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit’s embrace of the inverse ratio rule, the court admitted that its “checkered application” of the
rule, and indeed the very nature of the rule itself, “spawned uncertainty.”137 Nodding to a 1987 decision that declined to apply the
inverse ratio rule,138 the court characterized that case as a “momentary detour” along the Ninth Circuit’s route of applying the
rule in “confusing ways.”139 “[W]e did not explain how to apply the
rule,” the court lamented.140
The court then turned to William Patry, a well-respected copyright authority, to sum up the problem with the inverse ratio rule:
“The inverse ratio theory confuses fundamental principles of infringement analysis: access is relevant only in establishing the act
of copying, not in establishing the degree thereof. Once copying is
established, access is irrelevant and the inquiry shifts to the final
stage of the infringement analysis, material appropriation.”141
The court owned the confusion that resulted from the Blurred
Lines embrace of the inverse ratio rule, along with its subsequent
deletion from the amended opinion:
Just two years ago, we again sowed doubt whether the rule ought to
apply at all. In . . . Blurred Lines, the majority initially defended use
of the rule against the dissent’s criticism because the rule is “binding
precedent” that “we are bound to apply.” But in an amended opinion,
the court deleted all references to the rule.142

In perhaps the most elegant summary of the rule’s deficiencies, the
court described the problem with the sliding scale graph demanded
by the inverse ratio rule:
“The logical outcome of the claimed principle is obviously that proof of
actual access will render a showing of similarities entirely unnecessary.”143 However, “it does not follow that ‘more’ access increases the
likelihood of copying.” Yet that is what the rule compels. Complete

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1066–67.
Id. at 1067.
Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9.91 (2017)).
Id. at 1068 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 42, 47 and accompanying text and graph.
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access without any similarity should never result in infringement liability because there is no infringement. Even so, the rule suggests that
liability may be imposed in such a case.144

With the inverse ratio rule thusly abolished, the Ninth Circuit
overturned the decision of its three-judge panel and affirmed the
original jury verdict that Stairway to Heaven did not infringe Taurus.145 In fact, concurring Judge Paul Watford declared that “no
reasonable jury could have found infringement here.”146 At that
point, the lawsuit had only one place left to go: an appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Skidmore, the plaintiff, petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on August 6, 2020,147 but on October 5,
2020, the high Court denied the petition.148 The Stairway to
Heaven fight was over.149
C. Inverse Ratio Rule on Its Last Legs
The only remaining spot in the nation in which the inverse ratio
rule may still apply is the Sixth Circuit.150 That court, however,
sounds just as unimpressed with the rule as its sister circuits, mentioning it only in footnotes and indicating that the rule may be on
its way out.151
In a copyright infringement suit involving holiday light sculptures in the shape of polar bears, deer, and other winter themes,
the Sixth Circuit pointed out that, although the plaintiff invoked

144. Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1068 (citations omitted) (first quoting Arc Music Corp. v. Lee,
296 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1961); and then quoting David Aronoff, Exploding the “Inverse
Ratio Rule,” 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 125, 126 (2008)).
145. Id. at 1079.
146. Id. (Watford, J., concurring).
147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 141 S. Ct. 453 (2020) (No.
20-142).
148. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 141 S. Ct. 453 (2020) (mem.).
149. The decision was “seen as a win for the music industry. . . .” Gavin Evans, “Stairway
to Heaven” Copyright Battle Ends After U.S. Supreme Court Declines to Hear Case, COMPLEX
(Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.complex.com/music/2020/10/led-zeppelin-stairway-to-heavencopyright-battle-over-after-supreme-court-declines-to-hear-case
[https://perma.cc/3APCSN7W]; see also, e.g., Jem Aswad & Gene Maddaus, Led Zeppelin Wins ‘Stairway to Heaven’
Copyright Battle as Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Case, VARIETY (Oct. 5, 2020, 8:32 AM),
https://variety.com/2020/music/news/led-zeppelin-win-stairway-to-heaven-copyright-12347
92866/ [https://perma.cc/X7BL-BQTC].
150. See Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 536
n.1, 540 n.3 (6th Cir. 2020).
151. See, e.g., id.
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the inverse ratio rule in its filings, it failed to “meaningfully develop” its argument or clarify the lower standard by which substantial similarity must be judged if the court found the inverse
ratio rule to apply.152 Nevertheless, the court continued by spontaneously addressing the viability of the rule, noting that the Sixth
Circuit remains the lone adherent to the troublesome doctrine.153
“[F]undamental problems lie with the ‘inverse-ratio rule,’” the
court pronounced.154 After distancing itself from a previous invocation of the rule as “entirely dictum,” the court stated, “it does not
appear that this circuit has meaningfully relied on the rule, in
manner in which [plaintiff] requests, in any binding precedent. . . .
So questions remain whether the inverse-ratio rule applies (or
should apply) in our circuit. . . . [T]he ‘inverse-ratio rule’ appears
to be on its last legs.”155
IV. WHAT NOW?
With the deserved demise of the inverse ratio rule, the Ninth
Circuit needs a modified way of judging music copyright infringement cases. The question of access deserves a long, hard look given
the technological changes produced in society since the adoption of
the Copyright Act of 1976. As will become apparent below, the fundamental shift in the nature of digital access requires a change in
infringement analysis even in circuits that do not use the inverse
ratio rule.
A. Digital Age Creates New Landscape
In the non-digital past, access was open for more dispute than it
is now. While live performances and radio stations clearly provided
access to new music, fans often had to have physical, tangible albums in their possession when they wanted to hear a particular
song. Now, with the proliferation of digital music services such as

152. Id. at 536 n.1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citations omitted). The court declined to resolve whether the inverse ratio rule
applies in the Sixth Circuit, “given [the plaintiff’s] cursory presentation of the issue.” Id. As
its only remaining adherents seem tepid at best, the inverse ratio rule may, once a case
squarely presents the issue to the Sixth Circuit, become a deserved relic of a confusing past.
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Pandora, YouTube, and Spotify, access has exploded. Many of
these music services allow for playing a particular song on demand.
Imagine trying to prove that someone did—or did not—hear a
particular song in this digital age. Whether that person owns a
copy of the album on which the song appears, or has downloaded
the song itself, is far less probative of whether they have listened
to the song. It would be nearly impossible—if not actually impossible—to comb through someone’s listening history, or that of their
friends, in an attempt to prove that a particular song had or had
not been played.
Of course, courts have long allowed for an inference of access in
recognition of the fact that access is difficult to prove.156 But that
inference of access now works against a defendant in a music copyright case. How exactly can defendants prove that they did not
hear a particular song—even if they truly did not—when that song
is splashed all over YouTube?
The courts are not blind to how this technological shift impacts
copyright law. In fact, the Ninth Circuit discussed this issue in its
final Stairway to Heaven opinion:
As a practical matter, the concept of “access” is increasingly diluted in
our digitally interconnected world. Access is often proved by the wide
dissemination of the copyrighted work. Given the ubiquity of ways to
access media online, from YouTube to subscription services like Netflix and Spotify, access may be established by a trivial showing that
the work is available on demand.157

If the fact that a song is available on a music service serves as
proof of access—even if an individual truly never listened—it becomes difficult to imagine a scenario in which access is not found.
Furthermore, as the years advance, copyright suits over songs not
available on music services may very well all but disappear. Access
as a concept, therefore, has lost its probative value. With access
rendered nearly moot, the courts should adopt a new framework
for assessing music copyright infringement.158

156. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020).
157. Id. (citation omitted).
158. Access is not entirely beside the point. It remains logically impossible to copy a song
that one has not heard. Independent creation is still protected by copyright law. Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46, 348 (1991). See infra section
IV.B.1 for how my proposed framework accounts for this issue.
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B. Proposed Modification to the Music Copyright Infringement
Test
The inverse ratio rule, of course, has been rightly eliminated
from the Ninth Circuit’s copyright infringement test, so an up-todate diagram of current law appears below.

1. Removing Access from the Infringement Test
Given our new digital reality, retaining access as a factor in the
music copyright infringement test serves little purpose. Remember, judging a defendant’s access to an allegedly copied song does
not depend on whether she actually heard it; rather, it depends on
whether the song is available on demand.159 Very few songs will
fail to satisfy this standard.
A tiny percentage of songs, however, will slip through the cracks.
Think of songs that were written for a sole performance at, say, an
unfilmed retirement party. Or imagine a song a musician records
in her basement studio for the simple joy of creation, but never uploads to a service such as SoundCloud or YouTube. Clearly such
songs will constitute a microscopic portion of copyright infringe-

159. Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1068.
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ment cases because they will be nearly impossible to actually infringe. An unpublished song that the world does not know exists is
very difficult to listen to and copy.
Because this possibility, however slight, does exist, our copyright regime should capture it. For this reason, the courts should
retain the concept of access not as a factor in the infringement test,
but rather as an affirmative defense. Just as a defendant may raise
the affirmative defense of independent creation, so should a defendant be able to raise lack of access.160 The burden will then fall
on the defendant to prove that she never heard the song in question.
Two issues arise: Is it fair to place the burden of proof on the
defendant in such a case? I posit that the law does this already.
Given that a plaintiff may prove access simply by checking to see
whether a song is available on YouTube, the defendant, practically
speaking, already carries this burden of proof if she wishes to rebut. Making this change, therefore, will simply bring the law in
line with what is already taking place.
Second, as discussed above, lack of access is very difficult to
prove. It may seem cold comfort to insist that a defendant nevertheless has this option available to her as an affirmative defense.
But this question merits the same response: This is how music copyright suits function already. True, proving lack of access will be a
mammoth task. As the Ninth Circuit in Stairway to Heaven made
clear, however, this is currently the case.161 Reshaping the concept
of access into an affirmative defense will make it neither easier nor
harder to succeed in proving lack of access. Instead, it streamlines
the law to reflect our new digital reality, as depicted in the diagram
below.

160. Indeed, independent creation is clearly highly relevant to the question of infringement. Nevertheless, it exists as an affirmative defense, not as a prong within the infringement test. Cabining access to an affirmative defense will likewise not diminish the reality
that a genuine lack of access will stop an infringement suit in its tracks.
161. See Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1068.
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2. Removing Copying from the Infringement Test
Now that the inverse ratio rule has been nearly eliminated from
the nation’s courts,162 and given that access should be addressed as
an affirmative defense rather than within the infringement test,
very little is left under the first “copying” prong. Only “substantial
similarity between the works” remains.
a. Dual Use of Substantial Similarity Creates Confusion
The presence of substantial similarity under both prongs of the
infringement analysis has created extreme confusion, as detailed
previously regarding the Blurred Lines decision.163 The aforementioned Dark Horse case provides another potent example of such
confusion.164 In overturning the jury verdict as against the clear
weight of the evidence, Judge Christina Snyder articulated a legal
framework that switched between the two kinds of substantial similarity. First, she stated that a finding of copying requires access

162. The possible exception of the Sixth Circuit, which has backed away from the rule,
exists. See Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 536
n.1, 540 n.3 (6th Cir. 2020).
163. See supra section II.A.
164. Gray v. Perry, No. 2:15-CV-05642-CAS-JCx, 2020 WL 1275136, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 16, 2020); see supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
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and substantial similarity between the works.165 Then, she declared that substantial similarity is determined by the satisfaction
of both the extrinsic and intrinsic tests166—but this is true of substantial similarity under the “unlawful appropriation” prong, not
the “copying” prong. After describing more thoroughly the extrinsic
and intrinsic tests, Judge Snyder stated, “A plaintiff that proves
substantial similarity must still prove access”167—thereby switching back to the “copying” prong. Her analysis followed this same
pattern, delving into whether plaintiffs had satisfied the extrinsic
and intrinsic tests as she analyzed substantial similarity under the
“copying” prong.168 Once she reached her conclusions, she turned
next to the question of access to complete her inquiry into the first
prong, copying.169
Judge Snyder never explicitly reached the second prong, nor did
she use the words “unlawful appropriation” or “misappropriation”
in her opinion. Rather, she analyzed the second, more rigorous
“substantial similarity” element while she assessed copying.170 In
so doing, she folded the two steps of infringement analysis together, in what was otherwise an excellently reasoned and utterly
thorough examination of the musical issues presented.
b. Dual Use of Substantial Similarity Is Superfluous
As Judge Snyder’s opinion inadvertently highlighted, the presence of “substantial similarity” under both prongs of the infringement analysis not only creates crippling confusion but is also superfluous. It is true that, as discussed above, the identical
language refers to different levels of analysis.171 But the “copying”
substantial similarity is lax compared to the “unlawful appropriation” substantial similarity.172 The “copying” substantial similarity
asks only whether similarities exist that give rise to skepticism
that the work was independently created.173 It allows comparison
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Gray, 2020 WL 1275136, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4–13.
Id. at *13.
Id. at *4–13.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id.
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of unprotected elements.174 It is, in effect, the quantification of a
raised eyebrow. Once that low bar has been crossed, analysis proceeds to whether unlawful appropriation took place—and this is
where the heart of the analysis occurs.175 Indeed, Judge Snyder’s
thorough inquiry into unlawful appropriation-related substantial
similarity left nothing for copying-related substantial similarity to
investigate. Such odd duplication raises the question: Why bother
with it at all—especially given the massive confusion it engenders?
The higher courts have acknowledged the issues with the “copying” prong of infringement analysis. Speaking specifically of access
and substantial similarity under the “copying” prong, the Seventh
Circuit said, “The standard for copying is surprisingly muddled. . . . The various efforts to define these two key concepts . . .
have unfortunately had the unintended effect of obscuring rather
than clarifying the issues.”176 The Ninth Circuit has also bemoaned
“copying” confusion resulting from the duplication of “substantial
similarity” within both prongs: “The lack of clear guidance is likely
due in no small part to our use of the term ‘substantial similarity,’
both in the context of copying and unlawful appropriation, muddying the waters as to what part of the infringement analysis the rule
applies.”177
Given that the “copying” prong of the infringement test generates this level of confusion, it is surprising that courts cling to it.
What, exactly, is the benefit of proving copying for its own sake?
De minimis copying is not illegal.178 Copying unprotected elements
is not illegal.179 Any work that passes the raised-eyebrow standard
of the “copying” prong is then subjected to a rightly rigorous unlawful appropriation analysis—which, if the verdict comes in for
the plaintiff, establishes on its own that the material was wrongly
used. Unlawful appropriation analysis is where the work takes
place. If all that the first prong does is establish the existence of a
potential issue, I posit that it serves no genuine purpose. Isn’t the
lawsuit’s very existence evidence of a potential issue? If the suit is
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2012).
177. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2020).
178. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
179. But see supra note 25 regarding the problems arising under the intrinsic test, which
are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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without merit, the judge should throw it out. Everything else will
pass this meager standard.
c. “Copying” Is No Longer a Gatekeeper in the Digital World
In theory, the “copying” prong of infringement analysis serves as
a gatekeeper to the more stringent “unlawful appropriation” prong.
Since unlawful appropriation cannot take place without actual copying, establishing first that copying occurred was thought to be vital to infringement analysis. I have already explained why the copying test, in practice, amounts to the superfluous flagging of a
potential issue. But, given that copyright law theoretically protects
independently created identical works, does this prong of the infringement analysis nevertheless serve an important gatekeeping
function? Some evidence shows that the answer to this question,
practically speaking, is no:
[T]he [Stairway to Heaven] jury verdict form makes clear that the jury
did not decide whether Led Zeppelin had copied parts of “Taurus.” Rather, the jury ended its deliberations after deciding that “Taurus” and
“Stairway to Heaven” were not substantially similar under the extrinsic test. . . . [T]he jury did not reach the question of copying.180

Clearly, copying did not function as a gatekeeper in this case, as
the jury never even considered the question. But aside from practical evidence that copying does not serve as an effective gatekeeper, significant theoretical concerns exist.
While a careful balance of access and substantial similarity may
have effectively guarded the gate of years past, the framework
forming the pillars of that gate has crumbled in the shadow of today’s access-on-demand environment. With proof of access reduced
to a quick Google search ascertaining whether a particular song is
available on demand, and “copying” substantial similarity wrongly
analyzed or forgotten altogether, no vestiges of a gate remain to
defend. There is little point to debating how best to protect the gate
when the gate itself has been destroyed. Modifying the test to fit
current realities, therefore, is far more practical than pretending
the law defends a gate that no longer exists.

180.

Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1130 (9th Cir. 2018).
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d. “Copied” Label May Create Unfair Prejudice
Furthermore, the “copying” prong of infringement analysis has
the potential to create an overly prejudicial effect in the minds of
lay jurors. From the time we are small children, we have drilled
into our heads the concept that copying is lazy, shameful, and
wrong—that it essentially amounts to stealing. While law-trained
judges and attorneys may recognize that some copying is not
“wrong”—for example, de minimis copying or copying of ideas—expecting a lay jury to grasp that distinction seems ambitious. Once
a jury decides a song was copied, it is difficult to imagine that same
jury will reach the conclusion, “But that’s all right.” The opaque
nature of jury deliberations makes this question difficult to examine.
In fact, Thicke and Williams expressed concern about the psychological effects on the jury of labeling a song “copied”: “The
Thicke Parties claim [a jury] instruction was prejudicial based on
the improper admission of evidence that Thicke and Williams were
influenced by the ‘groove’ and ‘feel’ of [Got to Give It Up], and by
the Gayes’ efforts to portray Thicke and Williams as ‘copiers.’”181
The trial court, however, did not engage with this psychological argument in ruling that the jury instruction was acceptable.182 It
would be instructive to know how much weight the jury attached
to the finding that Blurred Lines was “copied” from Gaye as it proceeded to find unlawful appropriation.183
The “copying” prong has outlived its usefulness. Stripped of the
inverse ratio rule and access analysis, and given that substantial
similarity is far more effectively analyzed under the “unlawful appropriation” prong, the “copying” prong does nothing but bog down
the infringement test. Eliminating the prong will therefore both
streamline and clarify the law, as depicted below.

181. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL
4479500, at *16 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015).
182. Id.
183. Id. at *1.
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C. Streamlined Test Effectively Addresses Three Problems with
the Inverse Ratio Rule
Streamlining the test in this manner effectively addresses the
three pitfalls presented by the inverse ratio rule: (1) high access
but low similarity; (2) low access but high similarity, sometimes at
play in subconscious copying scenarios; and (3) inspiration or homage. Removing the “copying” prong from the analysis also addresses the lingering issues remaining in the interplay between access and substantial similarity, even after the abrogation of the
inverse ratio rule in the Ninth Circuit.
My streamlined test allows for in-depth analysis of unlawful appropriation within each of these three scenarios, without the unnecessary distraction of whether a song was “copied.” For example,
a high-access claim regarding a song bearing little similarity to a
supposed original ought to be rigorously analyzed. While a finding
of unlawful appropriation is certainly possible, the second creator
deserves a thorough review given that the two songs do not sound
much alike. The robust unlawful appropriation analysis should effectively analyze these issues. There is no need to slap an unhelpful—and possibly damning—label of “copied” on the song at the beginning of this process.
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In the same way, this streamlined test will take better care of
songs that sound similar to supposed originals, but where little access is found. The same rigorous unlawful appropriation analysis
will examine whether infringement—subconscious or otherwise—
has taken place, without, again, making use of the overly prejudicial label of “copied.” Finally, the streamlined test will analyze
songs that draw inspiration from, or even pay overt homage to, the
work of prominent musicians by focusing on the question that matters: “Did the songwriter take too much?” and not the unhelpful
inquiry of whether the song ought technically to be labeled as “copied.”
My streamlined test furthermore preserves the essential concepts of independent creation and lack of access as affirmative defenses. Independent creation is already an affirmative defense, and
given that access can be proven by a simple showing that a song is
available on demand, the burden of proving lack of access already
rests on the defendant if she wishes to rebut. Shifting lack of access
into an affirmative defense thus brings the law in line with what
is already taking place.
D. Streamlined Test Would Have Solved Many Blurred Lines
Controversies
The Blurred Lines litigation would have benefitted from this
streamlined analysis. At trial, too much weight fell on the amount
of access Thicke and Williams had to Gaye’s song, despite the fact
that Thicke and Williams readily admitted access.184 Then, that
high level of access was used under the improper inverse ratio rule
to lower the amount of substantial similarity the Gayes needed to
show between the songs. After that, the jury appears to have erroneously applied a lowered substantial similarity standard to the
“unlawful appropriation” question rather than to the “copying”
prong. The result? A multimillion-dollar verdict widely seen in the
music industry as unjust and anathematic to creativity.185
My streamlined test, however, would have freed the jury to focus
purely on whether the Gayes had satisfied the extrinsic and intrinsic tests for substantial similarity. Rather than bowing to the dic-

184. Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2018).
185. See supra section II.B.
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tates of an automatic rule, the jury could have thoughtfully balanced the desire of Thicke and Williams to pay tribute to Gaye’s
music against questions of whether they took too much. While various legal disputes would still have presented themselves—thus is
the nature of litigation, after all—the jury would have presumed
access, skipped the unnecessary debate over whether the song was
“copied,” and lasered in on unlawful appropriation. Who knows
what the result would have been if the bar to substantial similarity
had not been erroneously lowered? What is clear, however, is that
the decision’s reasoning would have been cleaner, more sensible,
and properly reflective of our new digital reality.
CONCLUSION
The final version of my proposed music copyright infringement
test appears below.
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After the surprise Blurred Lines verdict, the music industry panicked at the apparent reality that musicians could copyright a particular style or feel.186 The Stairway to Heaven case underscored
those fears when a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit overturned the jury verdict below and instructed further use of the inverse ratio rule.187 But the Ninth Circuit’s surprise abrogation of
the inverse ratio rule foreshadows creative restoration in the music
industry. Although we should continue to punish genuine thievery,
we will hopefully no longer be so afraid of the specter of litigation
that we cease to create.188 After all, the entire purpose of copyright
law is to promote art, not stifle it.189
The welcome debunking of the inverse ratio rule in the Ninth
Circuit has nevertheless left questions hanging about how to balance access with substantial similarity in order to prove copying.
And in every circuit, the digital world’s ubiquity of access has rendered nearly moot any sort of inquiry into access to an “original”
author’s works. Debilitating confusion has resulted from the existence of two separate substantial similarity tests. Finally, the question of copying is analyzed—when it is analyzed at all—under the
guise of keeping a gate that no longer exists. It is time to tighten
up the law and bring it in line with our new reality.
For that reason, the music copyright infringement test should
no longer contain two prongs. Rather than focusing on the nebulous concept of copying, the law should zero in on unlawful appropriation analysis—which, after all, is the heart of the issue. Access
should be presumed with rebuttal available as an affirmative defense. The weak, oft-forgotten substantial similarity under copying
analysis should disappear, allowing the robust substantial similarity analysis under the unlawful appropriation prong to take center
stage. Finally, “copying” as a label in and of itself should retire,
allowing the factfinder to focus instead on whether a defendant unlawfully appropriated a plaintiff’s song.

186. See supra notes 20–21, 82 and accompanying text.
187. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1137 (9th Cir. 2018).
188. “If this [Blurred Lines] jury verdict is allowed to stand, it will . . . have a deleterious
effect on composers who will have the spectre of frivolous lawsuits hanging over them as
they create new musical works tapping into the rich commonality of musical ideas that musicians have relied upon since time immemorial.” Musicologist Amici Brief, supra note 81,
at *23.
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Changing the law can be a long, arduous process, but it does
happen. And it should happen. While principles such as protecting
a creator’s work and encouraging imagination remain timeless, the
specific realities of our world evolve as the years pass. Our laws
should keep pace. We should not shrink from parting ways with a
standard that has grown feeble with age. Instead, we should protect creators of new and existing works by embracing a cleaner,
streamlined analysis that provides clarity rather than confusion.
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